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Introduction/Background Information 
CYBERWARFARE & CYBERSECURITY OVERVIEW 
Kang, Lin Yang. “The Threat, Defense, and Control of Cyber Warfare.” Center for International 
Maritime Security, April 17, 2017. http://cimsec.org/threat-defense-control-cyber-
warfare/32106  
 
This paper looks to present the dangers of cyberattacks and provide an outline of 
cyberdefense. The author begins by comparing cyberwarfare to special operations.  
They are both stealthy, difficult to detect attacks that are launched by covert forces. 
Small-scale cyberattacks can result in large-scale real-world damage. The high-yield, 
low-risk nature of cyberattacks appeals to non-state actors and state actors alike.  The 
lack of concrete international laws regarding cyberwarfare often allows perpetrators to 
act with impunity.     
 
Malekos Smith, Jessica. “Twilight Zone Conflicts: Employing Gray Tactics in Cyber Operations.”  
Small Wars Journal. October 27, 2016. http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/twilight-
zone-conflicts-employing-gray-tactics-in-cyber-operations.  
 
This article explores how Gray Zone Tactics and Hybrid Warfare are implemented 
through cyber operations. Revisionist powers that wish to change the international 
order can employ cyber operations as a tool to further their ambitions, as an 
unregulated cyberspace is easily influenced with minimal cost associated with a failed 
attack. Cyber operations can be an impactful political instrument that can be launched 
by third parties, or against various targets that may not be directly associated with the 
intended adversary.  
 
Štitilis, Darius, Paulius Pakutinskas, Uldis Kinis, and Inga Malinauskaitė. 2016. "Concepts and 





Cyber threats have evolved and expanded and in turn the areas impacted or at risk have 
expanded as well. The realm of cyberattacks has expanded from individuals and 
business to states, regions, general infrastructure and governments. Cyberattacks and 
even cyber wars have become more prevalent than their physical counterparts and 
need to be properly prepared for and countered. This piece seeks to evaluate different 
Cyber Security Strategies in governments, how effective they are, and do they have the 
legal ability to hold individuals or other governments accountable.         
 
White, Josh. “Cyber Threats and Cyber Security: National Security Issues, Policy and 
Strategies.”Global Security Studies 7, no. 4 (Fall, 2016): 23-





This paper seeks to provide awareness of different cyber threats on both an individual 
and statewide level. Following this, it suggest security measures that should be adopted 
on both those levels in order to combat current and future cyber threats. The 
importance of having a solid understanding of the growth and development of cyber 
threats is discussed along with past occurrences of cyberattacks both locally and 
internationally, and the security measures adopted afterwards; however, the rapid 
advancement of technology makes this difficult to keep up with.   
 
Nye, Joseph S. "Cyber Power." Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard  
Kennedy School,. March 2010. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/cyber-power.  
 
In the new cyber battlespace, power is no longer measured by the size of armies or 
economic stature. Power is measured in the capacity to wield influence in cyberspace 
and smaller state actors are able to decrease the power deficit between themselves and 
larger state actors. Additionally, cyber allows nonstate actors and proxy actors to have 
more capability to inflict direct damage upon state actors that they otherwise would 
have been unable to perpetrate prior to the modern digital age. The balance of power is 
being redefined by the introduction of the new context of cyber power. 
CYBERSECURITY TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 
Borghard, Erica D., and Shawn W. Lonergan. "The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace." Security  
Studies26, no. 3 (May 08, 2018): 452-81. 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306396.  
 
The article assesses the effectiveness of cyberspace as a medium to coerce and 
influence politics between state and non-state actors.  Their findings suggest that many 
tactics employed by state while effective hybrid strategies do not often coerce the 
desired political action from the target. Instead, it takes a certain level of cyber intrusion 
to incur a response. To reach the desired effect, an attack must employ, “attrition, 
denial, or decapitation strategies.” Much of these tactics target critical infrastructure 
that civilians rely on, and may lead to further international regulation and institutional 
normative behavior. 
 
"Cyber Security Strategy Documents." NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.  
January 22, 2018. https://ccdcoe.org/cyber-security-strategy-documents.html.  
 
This list created by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence is a 
compilation of all known national cyber security policy and legal documents that 
address the cyber domain. The list is updated periodically and focuses on NATO 
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partners, but other major cyber actors with published doctrines and strategies are 
included in the product.  
 
Libicki, Martin A. "Strategic Implications of Operational Cyberwar." In Cyberspace in Peace  
and War, 168-78. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016. 
 
This excerpt (chapter 15) requires USNWC library access or a copy of the book. This 
chapter from Cyberspace in Peace and War, explores three strategic implications of an 
operational cyberwar. First, the influence of cyberwar on the digitization strategies of 
other states. Second, military strategies that “operational cyberwar can shift the 
correlation of forces.” Third, the challenges of a decentralized defense in a cyberwar 
when attempting to coordinate with and protect allies. NATO and the U.S. are the two 
central figures in allied cyber defense; however, private corporations now play a role in 
the defense of key critical infrastructure and networked systems that allied nations rely 
on.  
Large Scale Cyberattacks & State Cyber Capabilities  
UKRAINIAN POWER GRID (2015) 
Buchanan, Ben . "Cyber Attacks on Ukraine's Power Grid: To What End?" International Institute  




In 2015 a cyberattack targeting one of Ukraine’s major power grid left nearly 250,000 
people without power. The attack is a prominent reminder of the capability of cyber 
warfare when targeting a state’s critical infrastructure and underscores the need for 
defending and hardening such vulnerable infrastructure. Investigators determined that 
the hackers could have caused more damage but it was likely a demonstration of power 
or capability for the responsible party.  The significance for western states, is that the 
Ukraine “uses equipment and security protections of the same vendors as everybody 
else around the world,” highlighting the potential for a significant vulnerability 
worldwide to critical infrastructure. 
DUQU 2.0 (2015) 
Paganini, Pierluigi. “Duqu 2.0: The Most Sophisticated Malware Ever Seen.” INFOSEC Institute. 
June 17, 2015. http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/duqu-2-0-the-most-sophisticated-
malware-ever-seen/#gref  
 
The second “strain” of the Duqu malware proved to be more sophisticated and came 
from a similar source as the original based on similarities in structure to the first Duqu. 
There is no definitive proof of the malware’s origins besides its similarities to other 
malware but the passkeys and other aspects utilized mimicked those of independent 
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hacking organizations in order to obstruct the origins of the malware. This attack was of 
note, not only due to its targeting of countries involved in the negotiations of the P5+1  
Iranian nuclear deal and several Middle Eastern countries but that it directly targeted, 
the security IT company,  Kaspersky Labs.     
    
DUQU (2011) 
“Iran Says it has ‘Controlled’ Duqu Malware Attack.” BBC, November 14, 2011. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-15721839  
 
The cyberattack, dubbed “Duqu” acted as a scouting mission on targeted computers.  It 
is believed that eight countries were impacted by this spyware, with Iran’s nuclear 
facilities being the primary target.  Duqu infiltrated the targeted system via an email 
depicted to appear as an official document.  Once the code had embedded itself in a 
particular computer it could be used to gather information, infect other networked 
computers, and leave modules behind that allow additional instructions to be sent to 
the program to tell it do collect different data or do different things, or to allow for the 
easier introduction of a new virus using the installed module.   
FLAME (2012) 
Lee, David. “Flame: Massive Cyber-Attack Discovered Researchers Say.” BBC, May 28, 2012. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-18238326  
 
A piece of malware, known as “Flame” due to the command word being used frequently 
in the code, was discovered in 2012 by Kaspersky Labs.  The malware which they believe 
had been active since 2010, targeted computers in Iran, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, and parts of Israel with the goal of stealing information and monitoring 
conversations. This was an active piece of software, once it infected a machine, the 
operators could issue commands to the machine and give it new instructions.  Kaspersky 
believed that this was a state-sponsored malware due to its complexity, selection of its 
targets, and type of information it was looking for.   
STUXNET  
Kelley, Michael B. “The Stuxnet Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Plant Was ‘Far More Dangerous’ Than 




The Stuxnet worm was a highly effective and innovative cyber weapon.  The article 
describes a worm that caused the destruction of one-fifth of Iran’s uranium enrichment 
centrifuges at the Natanz plant, and created an entire electronic blueprint of the entire 
nuclear plant.  Stuxnet was introduced through an usb drive into one of the Natanz 
plant’s computers where it then used the blueprint it created to understand how the 
7 | P a g e  
 
plant’s control and diagnostic systems worked. Using this information it slowly sped up 
the reactors until they reached critical levels and broke down, all the while sending 
normal operating information to the control panels.  This was believed to be a joint U.S. 
and Israeli operation that was introduced in phases.  One of the worm’s creators 
commented on the ease of introducing the worm via a thumbdrive, “It turns out there is 
always an idiot around who doesn’t think much about the thumb drive in their hand.” 
Espionage 
COMMERCIAL SABOTAGE AND ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 
Martemucci, Matteo G, USAF. “Unpunished Insults-The Looming Cyber Barbary Wars.” Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (Spring, 2015):53-62. 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1696876925?accountid=322  
 
Col. Martemucci evaluates the role the U.S. military and government played in 
protecting American commerce from the Barbary pirates in the early 19th century to the 
current cyberspace threats against American commerce, especially from China.  He 
argues that there is a role for the DoD and the U.S. Government in the protection of 
online commerce, but it would only be feasible with high levels of cooperation, 
information sharing, and a well regulated, transparent, agreement between the 
government, commercial industries, and the public.   
INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
Soshnikov, Andrei. “Inside a Pro-Russia Propaganda Machine in Ukraine.” BBC, November 13, 
2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-41915295 
 
A Russian propaganda unit, commonly known as the “troll factory” has been working in 
conjunction with a group out of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic that calls 
itself the Russian Liberation Movement. These groups have been creating fake news 
stories and propaganda videos pretending to be members of extremist groups from 
Ukraine. They claim to be responsible for attacks in Russia or members of fascist 
organizations operating out of Kiev, or even part of ISIS employed to fight by the 
Ukrainian government.  
 
Chen, Adrian. “The Agency.” New York Times Magazine, June 2, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html 
 
Russian propaganda factories are state sponsored offices where workers are paid for 
promoting Russian propaganda and values and denouncing Western ideologies. They 
are the foundation of Russian information operations and are key to controlling the 
narrative and influencing social dialogue on key salient issues. This article explores how 
these organizations conduct information campaigns on behalf of the Russian state.  
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Former workers talk about how bloggers are paid to use forums and social networks at 
home and abroad to promote anti-Western and pro-Kremlin commentary and 
ideologies.  These bloggers push state-sponsored content under the guise of regular 
civilians to sway popular opinion in Russia.  
CYBER TERRORISM 




Bitcoin is most recognizably viewed as a powerful investment and asset, but due to its 
lack of central repository or administrator, it is often used for fraud and organized 
crime. The EU has introduced regulations and will begin to monitor and crackdown on 
cryptocurrencies under the premise of counterterrorism operations as arms dealers on 
the dark web are using the cryptocurrencies as their primary form of transaction. 
Jihadist groups are using cryptocurrencies due to its convenience as a replacement for 
‘hawala’ so that brokers no longer need to transfer money physically from place to 
place.  
 
Kenny, Michael. “Cyber-Terrorism in a Post-Stuxnet World.” Orbis 59, no. 1 (Winter, 2015):111-
128. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2014.11.009   
 
This article focuses on how cyberterrorism is its own unique threat and should not be 
haphazardly placed in the same category as cybercrime, cyberattacks, cyberwarfare, or 
hacking/hacktivist activities. Cyberterrorism is in essence the use of digital means to 
conduct a terrorist attack. Shutting down power grids, turning off vital transportation 
direction systems or impacting water supplies are examples of what cyberterrorism 
would be akin to.  The article to gives definitions and descriptions of cyberattacks, 
cyberwarfare, hacktivism and cyberterrorism and show that while they all belong in the 
same “genus” of online attacks, and share some similar characteristics, cyberterrorism 
along is designed to cause widespread fear or physical intimidation and produce 
physical violence and individuals and infrastructure.  A chart is provided comparing the 
different attributes of each type of cyberattack.  
 
ISLAMIC STATE 
Clarke, Colin P., and Chad C. Serena. "What Happens After ISIS Goes Underground." National  
Interest. May 29, 2017. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-happens-after-isis-
goes-underground-20881?page=show. 
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ISIS continues to lose territory in kinetic battles against coalition partners and anti-
extremist operations across the globe. The group has been forced to reevaluate its 
ability to sustain itself against conventional forces and has once again through its 
propaganda and social media channels called on a global movement to conduct 
widespread attacks in western nations. ISIS is in a struggle to survive is transitioning 
back to an underground insurgency with global affiliates. Part of this plan could be to 
use the accessible cyberspace to launch new forms of attacks against COIN forces. Part 
of this effort to improve their cyber capabilities could be to leverage cyber crypto 
currencies as their new means of primary financial funding. ISIS has proven that they are 
able to evolve to meet the challenges of modern warfare, using drones to drop 
explosives, conduct advanced propaganda campaigns, and govern territories and collect 
taxes. The next phase of their evolution points towards an emphasis on cyber 
operations. 
 
Clarke, Colin P., and Isaac R. Porche III. "The Online Fight Against ISIS." Rand. April 1, 2016.  
https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/04/the-online-fight-against-isis.html.  
 
As ISIS loses its foothold in the Middle East, ISIS is seeking to enter the cyber battlespace 
and attack vulnerable infrastructure in coalition states. Non-state actors have few 
limitations preventing them from being able to effectively conduct attacks from the 
cyber domain. As we continue to advance in the digital age, cyber mercenaries and 
armed groups will develop new and sophisticated methods of financing their operations 
and launching attacks. Coalition forces will need to forge a strategy that identifies 
vulnerable critical infrastructure and develop offensive capabilities to mitigate the 
potential damage ISIS hackers could inflict on allied forces.  
 
Brown, Michael A., and Daniel M. Gerstein. "Anonymous vs. ISIS: Wishing the Vigilante Hackers  




The Hackers and self-proclaimed vigilantes known as Anonymous are taking their fight 
to ISIS. The hackers have begun assaulting the jihadist group’s social media channels and 
other public outreach. While non-state actors combating ISIS is not a new phenomenon, 
it is the first time that non-state groups have clashed over cyberspace. Anonymous’ 
attack on ISIS could be used by coalition forces as an example of how to exploit 
vulnerabilities that ISIS may have in its cyber presence.  
Russia 
CAPABILITY, INITIATIVES, AND POLICIES 
Tucker, Patrick. "If War Comes, Russia Could Disconnect from the Internet. Yes, the Entire  
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In an effort to harden Russian defense against cyber threats, Russia has transitioned 
much of its online infrastructure to internal networks that would prohibit unauthorized 
access from key servers in the event of a breech. The effort took two years of network 
overhauls, the reduced dependence on outside information technology and ability to 
unplug Russian military tech from the outside gives Russia an edge should the state 
enter conflict with another technologically advanced power.  
ESTONIA DDOS ATTACK 2007 
Alenius, Kari. “An Exceptional War That Ended in Victory for Estonia or an Ordinary e-
Disturbance? Estonian Narratives of the Cyber-Attacks in 2007.” European Conference 
on Information Warfare and Security.  (July, 2012): 18-24, VIII. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1035293217/fulltextPDF/FF9AC32A623C47B6PQ/
1?accountid=322     
 
In 2007, Estonia was on the receiving end of daily cyberattacks for several weeks in 
response to the moving of a memorial to Russian forces.  Street protests erupted by 
Russian speaking residents when the move was announced and soon after on April 27, 
the cyberattacks began.  The attacks mainly targeted Estonian government institutions 
with a variety of spamming and direct denial of service (DDOS) attacks.  The 
sophistication and organization of these attacks leads to suspicion of the Russian 
government (since some of the attacks originated directly from Russian government 
buildings), which Moscow denies despite having previously warned Estonia not to move 
the statute.    
CYBER ATTACK ON GEORGIA PRE-INVASION 2008 
Hollis, David. “Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008.” Small Wars Journal, 2010. 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/639-hollis.pdf  
  
In order to destabilize the Georgian military, Russia launched a coordinated cyberattack 
in congress with their military invasion. This was an unprecedented action as it was the 
first joint cyber and kinetic attack.  The targets included communication and finance 
website which left Georgian citizens unable to receive information or instructions and 
created large scale confusion and distraction which impacted the Georgian 
government’s response to the aggression.    
RUSSIAN AGGRESSION 
Marks, Joseph. “Once Stealthy, Russian Hackers Now Go Toe to Toe with US Defenders”  
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Defense One, March 22, 2017. http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2017/03/once-
stealthy-russian-hackers-now-go-toe-toe-us-defenders/136374/?oref=d-river  
 
In late 2015, the typical behavior of Russian hackers changed.  Normally when caught or 
confronted online, they would retreat from the system with whatever they could grab, 
yet they had started to become more assertive. These hackers would stay and try to 
counteract or block the NSA agents’ response and continue their work. While the NSA 
would not name the specific actors, private firms would around this same time, FireEye, 
a cybersecurity company reported similar actions being undertaken by Russian hackers.  
They were no longer running, but had been emboldened and were pushing back and not 
bothering to clean up their trails. It seemed that at times, they wanted their capabilities 
to be known.  
 
Maldre, Patrik. “The Russian Cyber Threat: Views from Estonia.” Europe’s Edge, Center for  
European Policy Analysis (CEPA). May 18, 2016. http://cepa.org/The-Russian-Cyber-
Threat-Views-from-Estonia  
 
The small country of Estonia has become a leader in cyber defense through necessity. 
Russia has been targeting Estonia and other countries in the area for close to a decade. 
The agencies responsible for Estonian cyber security issued a report claiming that “in 
cyberspace, Russia is the source of the greatest threat to Estonia, the European Union 
and NATO. The FSB is believed to spend up to $250 million a year on professional cyber 
threat actors with the goal of disrupting foreign command and control systems and 
damaging infrastructure.     
 
Curran, John. “DoJ Charges Russian Government Security Officials in Yahoo Hack.” Cybersecurity 




Indictments of four people, including members of the Russian FSB were announced by 
the DOJ in response to the hacking of Yahoo and the theft of a large number of 
subscribers’ e-mails and information.  Attorney General Jeff Sessions reaffirmed a 
commitment to identifying and prosecuting those responsible for future cyberattacks.  
In addition, members of Congress called for further investigation into the attack in order 
to gain valuable information about how Russian cyber operations are conducted and 
also for private companies to be more forthcoming and cooperative with the  
Government.  
China 
CHINESE CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY 
Kowalewski, Annie. "China’s Evolving Cybersecurity Strategy." Georgetown Security Studies  
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This article explores China’s doctrine, training, and efforts in the cyber domain. China is 
placing an increased emphasis is reforming their military to adapt to contemporary 
military strategies by integrating cyber security as a cornerstone of its new doctrine. 
Information wars and influence operations are important aspects of modern military 
conflict and China’s organizational restructuring of their cyber, space, and 
electromagnetic forces is an attempt to consolidate and improve upon these domains 
by creating a new military branch dedicated to those efforts.  
 
Kania, Elsa, Samm Sacks, Paul Triolo, and Graham Webster. "China’s Strategic Thinking on  




This article is a comprehensive outline and translation of the key points in China’s new 
cyber strategy. “China’s strategy calls for developing capabilities and governance 
capacity in four major baskets: managing internet content and creating “positive 
energy” online; ensuring general cybersecurity, including protecting critical information 
infrastructure; developing an independent, domestic technological base for the 
hardware and software that undergird of the Internet in China; and increasing China’s 
role in building, governing, and operating the Internet globally.” China’s latest efforts 
focus on their ability to influence the internet internationally and become a global 
power in the cyber domain.  
 
JAPAN’S COUNTER STRATEGY 
Lui, Helen. "Japan’s Cybersecurity Strategy: Deterring China with Selective Engagements."  




Japan has increased its cyber capabilities in response to its concerns with China, Russia, 
and North Korea. Distrust between Japan and China has prevented a political dialogue 
over normative behavior in the cyber domain and Japan’s development of cyber 
institutions is reflective of their concern for China’s assertive posture in the cyber 
domain. Japan’s efforts to keep stride with China and become a major player in the 
cyber domain is parallel with their national defense spending and efforts to become 
more militarized.  
 
CHINESE CYBER CAPABILITIES 
Nye, Joseph. "Can China Be Deterred in Cyber Space?" The Diplomat. February 3, 2016.  




Due to the nature of international institutions, political influence, and state reputation, 
it is often easier to deter state actors from committing cyberattacks than non-state 
actors. Economic interdependence between China and the United States has largely 
deterred China from acting against U.S. infrastructure or economic holdings. States that 
don’t have the same level of interdependence may be more inclined to use cyber 
techniques to harm other states, but sanctions issued by powerful adversaries such as 
the U.S. on states like North Korea is an effective tool to increase costs in the decision-
making process. Hardening cyber defenses is a necessary strategy to mitigate damage 
from cyberattacks, but perhaps more effective against state sponsored cyberattacks are 
the political tools wielded by actors in the international system. 
 
OPM HACK 
Koerner, Brendan I. “Inside the Cyberattack that Shocked the U.S. Government.” WIRED.  
October 23, 2016. https://www.wired.com/2016/10/inside-cyberattack-shocked-us-
government/ 
 
The Massive data breach from individuals operating out of China compromised the 
highly sensitive information of a large portion of government employees. This article 
goes into great detail regarding how the attackers accessed the information, how the 
breach was found out and the countless hours of work spent on countering the breach.  
North Korea 
CYBER CAPABILITY 
Valeriano, Brandon, and Benjamin Jensen. "North Korea’s Offensive Cyber Program Might Be  




North Korea’s offensive cyber program may not be the veiled giant that some suggest. 
The program has not yet inflicted extensive damage on adversarial state actors, but it 
has been linked to high profile hacking attacks such as “WannaCry” and “Sony 2013”. 
Their success cannot yet be measured politically, and the article estimates they have 
only managed to steal $81 million.  While their cyber operations are cheap and provide 
valuable international influence, the author suggests that there is little, “actual 
demonstrated ability to achieve leverage through cyber operations.” 
 
SONY HACK 2013 
Sanger, David E. and Martin Fackler. “N.S.A. Breached North Korean Networks before Sony 
Attack, Officials Say.” New York Times, January 18, 2015.  





A North Korean defector told U.S. government officials that North Korea has been 
perfecting its hacking and cyberattacking abilities over the past 30 years. They have 
developed techniques aimed towards breaching the systems of individual countries. The 
NSA had managed to infiltrate this network and monitor some of the computers utilized 
on it. Sony Pictures was hacked and its information and emails publicized in response to 
an upcoming movie that depicted a fictional assassination of Kim Jong Un. This was a 
unique case in which the U.S. directly blamed another nation for a cyberattack.  
 
Iran 
IRANIAN CYBER CAPABILITIES 
Herr, Trey, and Laura K. Bate. "The Iranian Cyberthreat is Real." Foreign Policy. July 26, 2017.  
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/26/the-iranian-cyberthreat-is-real/.  
 
Cyber operations and attacks in the Middle East have change the dynamics of politics 
among neighbors. As states use the proxy conflicts in Yemen and Syria as kinetic 
expressions of force, a battle over cyberspace is unfolding between regional powers. 
Iran, having been the target of cyberattacks, are now capable of wielding their own 
influence in cyberspace. Techniques such as defacements, censorship, information 
controls, espionage campaigns, multifaceted attacks, social media manipulation, and 
infrastructure attacks are all tools in the Iranian cyber weapons bag.  
 
Adelkhah, Nima. "Iran and Its Cyber-Terrorism Strategies." Jamestown Foundation. May 16,  
2016. https://jamestown.org/program/iran-and-its-cyber-terrorism-strategies/.  
 
Iran’s employment of offensive cyber operations against the U.S. and its allies have been 
conducted either directly or through the use of proxies. The attacks have dated back to 
2009 and have spanned from attacks on infrastructure and businesses to complex 
information operations. Iran’s defensive posture stems from suspected efforts by the 
United States and Israel intended to undermine the political institutions of the Iranian 
government. Iran describes these efforts as cyber-terrorism, and the article identifies 
two forms of cyberattacks that Iran defends against. The first are “soft” attacks, which 
are conducted through information operations intended to influence the values and 
belief systems of the targeted population. The second, are “hard” attacks, which are 
directed hacking efforts against infrastructure or websites with the intent of denying 
service.  
 
Libicki, Martin. "Iran: A Rising Cyber Power?" Cipher Brief. December 15, 2015.  
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/cyber/iran-a-rising-cyber-power.  
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According to the Article, Iran leverages its influence over the cyber domain to achieve 
four primary objectives. “First, Iran wants to keep its citizens under surveillance. Second, 
Iran wants to know the intentions and capabilities of other countries. Third, Iran wants a 
capability to harass those it sees as its foes. Fourth, it may be preparing larger attacks.”  
 
2012 ATTACK ON SAUDI ARABIA’S NATIONAL OIL AND GAS UTILITY – SHAMOON ATTACK 
Bronk, Christopher. and Eneken Tikk-Ringas. “The Cyber Attack on Saudi Aramco.” Survival 55, 
no. 2 (April 3, 2013): 81-96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2013.784468  
 
Saudi Arabia’s national oil and gas producer, Aramco, suffered a cyberattack on August 
15, 2012 which infected up to 30,000 of its computers with a self-replicating virus. The 
virus, later referred to as Shamoon, resulted in wholesale deletion of hard drives but not 
before it transferred the data back to the virus's source. This did not cause any physical 
damage but resulted in production delays and impacted business processes for almost 
two weeks. The virus was traced to a hacking group operating out of Iran, which 
referred to itself as “The Cutting Sword of Justice.” It is uncertain if the Iranian 
government sanctioned the attack, but in a country with controlled internet, they were 
definitely aware of it. An important “lesson’s learned” moment from this attack was the 
importance of keeping operations segregated into different and independent computer 
systems.     
Europe & European Union 
POLICIES AND INITIATIVES 
Bendiek, Annegret. "Europe’s Patchwork Approach to Cyber Defense Needs a Complete  




Despite extensive policies and agreements among the European Union, there is still 
doubt as to how the EU would react to a cyberattack targeting key critical infrastructure. 
One of the major problems lies in the decentralized cyber defense agencies that operate 
independently. In order to effectively combat significant cyber threats, the organizations 
would need to work in congress, something that has not yet been resolved. The article 
suggests that a comprehensive review and restructuring of the EU’s cyber defense 
policies, and an organizational shift from multiple decentralized agencies into a single 
centralized body would harden the EU’s ability to respond to cyber threats. 
 
European Commission. European Union External Action. "EU Cybersecurity plan to protect open  
Internet and online freedom and opportunity." News release, February 7, 2013. 
European Commission. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-94_en.htm.  
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This press release by the European Union outlines their cybersecurity strategy in an 
effort to protect European democracy and their digital economy. The policy must be 
adopted by each member state, and must adhere to security practice standards 
established by the EU.  The EU’s new strategy has five key priorities.  
1. Achieve cyber resilience 
2. Reduce cybercrime 
3.  Develop cyber defense policy and capabilities related to the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
4. Develop the industrial and technological resources for cybersecurity 
5. Establish a coherent international cyberspace policy for the EU and promote EU 
values 
United States 
RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA 




This article outlines how the history of Russian information operations has molded their 
efforts in the modern cyber world. What was once traditional espionage is now 
launched through cyberspace, and the United States has found itself the target 
(sometimes indirectly) of those efforts. The United States now has to decide how to 
react and respond to Russian cyber-attacks, and one such method could be advancing 
the conversation on establishing normative behavior for state actors in cyberspace. 
 
Libicki, Martin C. "Checklist for a U.S.-Russia Cyberwar." Tech Crunch. October 31, 2016.  
https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/31/checklist-for-a-u-s-russia-cyberwar/.  
 
This article by Rand Senior Scientist Martin Libicki examines the fallout of the Russian 
election tampering and offers a question response format to some of the most 
provoking questions involving a cyberwar between Russia and the U.S. Some of the 
questions asked are, what type of response should the U.S. have for Russian aggression? 
How harsh should the response be? Which nation has greater capability to fight a 
cyberwar? Who would win in a tit-for-tat fight in cyberspace?  
 
U.S. CAPABILITY 
Paul, Christopher, and Rand Waltzman. "How the Pentagon Should Deter Cyber Attacks."  
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The Pentagon needs to realize that state actors and non-state actors alike are “not 
afraid to launch attacks against the United States in and through cyberspace.” While 
they may not be willing to escalate to full conflict, cyberattacks which occupy a space in 
the grey zone are mediums which nations are willing to launch disruptive attacks that 
the Pentagon needs to be prepared to defend against. This article outlines five 
recommendations that the Pentagon can use to better defend themselves against cyber 
threats. First, the DoD should narrowly define the scope of how cyber is used and 
categorize cyber efforts appropriately. Second, expand the cyber domain into the 
physical domain so that cyber efforts have an impact on other capabilities and activities. 
Third, deterrence should be thought of as influence, and should focus on how actions 
are perceived internationally so that the U.S. response can change how potential 
aggressors make their decisions. Fourth, attempt to develop norms that can play a role 
in deterrence and establishing expected responses to behavior in the cyber domain. 
Fifth, establish consequences for adversarial actions that are appropriate.  
 
U.S. CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY 
Porche, Isaac R. III, Christopher Paul, Chad C. Serena, Colin P. Clarke, Erin-Elizabeth Johnson,  
and Drew Herrick, Tactical Cyber: Building a Strategy for Cyber Support to Corps and 
Below. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1600.html.  Also available in print 
form.  
 
This report provides recommendations to the Army’s Cyber Command for incorporating 
cyber operations into the Army’s conventional warfighting capability. The Army’s efforts 
to support their conventional warfighters with defensive and offensive cyber warfare is 
a delicate process that requires JIIM partners to be integrated at the tactical and 
strategic level without the Arm’s ability to kinetically engage the enemy. The report 
highlights key challenges and recommendations to approach this daunting task. 
 




This document is the DoD Cyber Strategy that is implemented by all branches of the U.S. 
Military and its partners. As the focus continues to shift away from irregular warfare and 
towards state-to-state conflict, the cyber domain will become increasingly contested. 
This document outlines the DoD’s doctrine and strategy for employing force and 
exerting influence across cyberspace.  
 
U.S. HEGEMONY 
Posen, Barry R. "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony." The 
MIT Press28, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 5-46. 





This article emphasizes the preservation of U.S. hegemony through the application of 
military force and deterrence activities across multiple domains.  U.S. dominance of 
common space (air and sea) preserves the power of the U.S. over other great powers, 
and this “command of the commons” is what allows for the U.S. and its allies to exert 
political influence beyond its borders. As we move forward into a new common, the 
cyber domain, the principles discussed in the exertion of command over the commons 
may prove valuable in preserving U.S. hegemony and deterring other great powers from 
challenging allied interests in contested spaces.  
Cultural Coercion & Political Manipulation 
RUSSIAN INFORMATION WARFARE 
Giles, Keir. “Handbook of Russian Information Warfare.” NATO Defense College (NDC). 
Fellowship Monograph. November 9, 2016. 
http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=506 
 
This piece by the NDC provides a look at Russian information warfare from the start of 
the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 to 2016. Russia would not only utilize its own 
ideas and concept but borrow techniques and practices that it though other countries 
would using against it and in turn fold them into the Russian arsenal of information 
warfare. This guide seeks to provide an introduction to Russian information warfare 
along with its origins, evolution and potential future challenges. This style of warfare is 
not limited to pre-hostilities or active warfare but is a constant endeavor to gain the 
upper hand in any way possible.  The techniques are not just limited to hacking and 
theft of information but coordinated campaigns by state sponsored media, government 
sources, celebrities and TV shows, online videos and widespread online trolling 
campaigns are all utilized to control opinions at home and garner support abroad.  
 
RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA 
Frenkel, Sheera. “Were You a Victim of Russian Propaganda? Facebook Will Help You Find Out.” 
New York Times, November 22, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/22/technology/facebook-russia-propaganda.html  
 
Utilizing fake posts and manufacturing news stories and groups, paid Russian 
propagandists posted information on Facebook on Instagram that was seen by over 29 
million Americans and after sharing and re-sharing the posts, it is believed that 150 
million people saw this post. The Russian government purchased ads directly from 
Facebook and an estimated 10 million people saw these ads on Election Day along. 
These posts were utilized to antagonize, influence and mislead users.  Facebook, Twitter 
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and Google all were required to testify before Congress in regards to what they were 
doing to counter this.  
Transportation Vulnerabilities 
PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION  
Curran, John. “Senators Reintroduce Bills Focused on Vehicle, Aircraft Cybersecurity.” 




 A bill was reintroduced to Congress with the goal of not only setting exact fines for 
specific hacking of cars and commercial aircraft but to require the U.S. manufacturers 
to install better hacking countermeasures.  The bill also calls for isolation systems to 
prevent the entire vehicle from being impacted if hacked and will require a “cyber 
dashboard” which will show the consumer the level of hacking protection and privacy 
protection the vehicle has above the minimum set by the government. Also, any 
attempted or successful attacks would need to be shared with the manufacturers and 
the FAA in order to identify and fix the exploit.   
Laws and Rulings/Treaties/Documentation  
INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, NORMATIVE BEHAVIORS, POLICIES 
Nye, Joseph S. "How Will New Cybersecurity Norms Develop?" Australian Strategic Policy  
Institute. March 12, 2018. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-will-cybersecurity-
norms-develop/.   
 
In the United Nations, there is currently no regulatory body to protect citizens from 
cyber warfare.  During a time when cyberattacks are among the greatest source of 
concern of international security, the international community is devoid of laws and 
norms that govern the environment. The internet is transnational, though the operators 
fall under sovereign nations. As the world becomes more networked, the potential 
targets for attack and number states and non-state actors able to commit cybercrimes 
will grow, requiring regulations to be created that administer over the cyber domain.  
 





This article compares international attempts to control the use of cyber weapons to 
WMD proliferation efforts. The article examines several different models of regulation 
and controls by looking at the use of proliferation, alliances, and proxy relationships, 
and determines their effectiveness in governing international cybersecurity initiatives. 
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Morgus, Robert. "Russia Gains an Upper Hand in the Cyber Norms Debate." Council on Foreign 
Relations. December 5, 2016. https://www.cfr.org/blog/russia-gains-upper-hand-cyber-
norms-debate.  
Following the Russian meddling in the U.S. democratic process, nations are now 
scrambling to create an established set of international norms on how states deal with 
attacks that occur over cyberspace. The article introduces two forms of normative 
behaviors in international politics, ‘actual norms’ where states understand expected 
behavior and mostly adhere to it, and ‘aspirational norms’ where states understand an 
expected behavior, but they are not institutionalized or universally accepted. The 
cyberspace debate falls into the latter category, and without international regulation 
and established institutional norms, influence operations and directed attacks over 
cyberspace will continue to be met with varying degrees of arbitrary response.  
Nye, Joseph S. "The World Needs an Arms-control Treaty for Cybersecurity." Washington Post. 
October 1, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-world-needs-an-
arms-control-treaty-for-cybersecurity/2015/10/01/20c3e970-66dd-11e5-9223-
70cb36460919_story.html.  
This article by Joseph Nye argues International cybersecurity requires an arms-control 
treaty. In modern history, devastating technologies that have the ability to change the 
landscape of battlefields have been met with arms-control agreements. Cybersecurity is 
the next such technology that requires international norms and treaties to govern its 
use. The author argues that the approaches of the past cannot be used as an effective 
model, as the static nuclear treaties do not translate well into an involving cyber world 
that exists in grey areas. Treaties that generate normative behavior must be the goal 
during the formation of cyber arms-control agreements. 
Gerstein, Daniel M. "Define Acceptable Cyberspace Behavior." Rand. September 27, 2015. 
https://www.rand.org/blog/2015/09/define-acceptable-cyberspace-behavior.html. 
As China and the U.S. met in part to discuss cyberspace behavior and agree to terms 
that would prevent cyber espionage, their meeting fueled the debate over what is 
acceptable normative behavior. The article continues to discuss other international 
treaties and how a framework of defining cyberspace behavior that would be acceptable 
to all international parties may be problematic. The first step is to create a 
comprehensive cyber doctrine that defines how the U.S. responds to targeted cyber 
based offenses by state actors. 
TALLINN MANUAL
Schmitt, Michael N., and Liis Vihul, eds. "Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law                 
 Applicable to Cyber Operations." Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
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This four part video series of the panels held at the symposium covers the topics of 
sovereignty in cyberspace, jurisdiction over cyber activities, international human rights 
laws in cyberspace and other topics.  Featured panel speakers included representatives 
from USMA West Point, Harvard, Cornell, NATO CCD COE, UCLA, Syracuse University, 
University of Texas, Boston University, University College London, BYU Law School, 
Stifftung Wissenschaft und Politik, and Human Rights Watch.  
STATE LEGISLATURE 
National Conference of State Legislatures. “Cybersecurity Legislation 2016.” December 8, 2016. 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/cybersecurity-legislation-2016.aspx  
This is an annually updated collection of state cybersecurity legislation and including a 
description and the status of each proposal.  
AFRICAN INTERNET CONTROLS 
Ellis, Harriet. "Freedom or Firewalls: Shaping Africa's Internet." International Institute for 
Strategic Studies. February 27, 2017. 
https://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2017-adeb/february-
b85c/freedom-or-firewalls-c6ea.  
Political stability and the disruptive power of social media are shaping how African 
nations are crafting policy and governing the internet. In Africa, while only 25% of the 
population use the internet, that number is rising quickly with the distribution of 
smartphones and other handheld devices. As nations like Cameroon begin to regulate 
internet usage in their country in a way that mirrors the Chinese model of controlled 
cyberspace, western democracies contest that the regulations can disrupt democratic 
processes and ideologies.  
Ethics/Ambiguity 
Singer, P.W. “Stuxnet and its Hidden Lessons on the Ethics of Cyberweapons.” Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015): 79-86. 
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=jil 
This article briefly describes the use of the Stuxnet worm and its end goal before moving 
on to evaluating the ethics of utilizing this particular cyberweapon and cyberweapons in 
general. While Stuxnet might be seen as the digital “Pandora’s Box” for state sponsored 
cyberattacks, the worm itself only impacted one particular system and did not harm any 
of the other devices it infected in order to transmit itself to the final target of Iranian 
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nuclear centrifuges. This worm was unique in that a digitally transmitted action caused 
real-world physical destruction yet had no collateral damage or caused any physical 
harm to individuals working at the facility.    
 
Crosston, Matthew. “DUQU’s DILEMMA: The Ambiguity Assertion and the Futility of Sanitized 
Cyber War.” Proceedings of the International conference on Information Warfare & 
Security. (January 1, 2013):43-50. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=86139890&site=ehos
t-live   
 
In order to attempt to discern an appropriate state level response to cyberattacks, 
regulators and international orders repeatedly call for the Law of Armed Conflict or a 
form of internationally adopted legal framework to be utilized/created to create a 
standardized response to a cyberattack.  However, cyberattacks blur the lines between 
military and civilian, often time using civilian systems in order to protect the sponsor 
state’s government from retribution. These standards, normally applied to physical 
conflict are not enforceable nor applicable to the ambiguity of the cyber realm.    
National/International Cybersecurity   
CENTERS/AGENCIES & POLICIES 
"Organizations and Institutions That Address International Cybersecurity." Information 
Technology Industry Council. https://www.itic.org/dotAsset/c/c/cc91d83a-e8a9-40ac-
8d75-0f544ba41a71.pdf.  
 
 This document by the Information Technology Industry Council is a comprehensive list 
of every known organization and institution that addresses international cybersecurity 
and provides a link to the organization’s website, and the scope of their operations.  
 
U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Factsheets/Factsheet-
View/Article/960492/us-cyber-command-uscybercom/  
 
U.S. Cyber Command leads the daily operations required to protect the Department of 
Defense networks from intrusion, outside attacks and any from being compromised in 
anyway.  It also conducts military cyberspace operations and supplies support for 
external missions and increases the U.S.’ ability to withstand cyberattacks. 
USCYBERCOM includes the cyber commands for all of the armed forces and its own 
Cyber Missions Teams.   
 
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCDCOE). https://ccdcoe.org/  
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This NATO center is a compilation of experts from various backgrounds, including, 
educators, military, government, researchers and analysis with the purpose of providing 
a thorough look at current levels of cybersecurity and who to improve upon them. This 
center consists of members from 20 different nations.  
Educational Resources/Tools/Contextualizing Cyber 
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES AND TOOLS 
 
International Cyber Developments Review (INCYDER). NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre 
of Excellence (NATO CCDCOE). https://ccdcoe.org/incyder.html  
 
The INCYDER is NATO’s interactive research database for legal and policy documents 
that are utilized by international cybersecurity organizations.  The database is 
periodically updated to reflect institutional changes to international cybersecurity 
regulations and policy. 
 
Mcroskey, Erick D., and Charles A. Mock. “Operational Graphics for Cyberspace.” Joint Force 
Quarterly 85 (2nd Quarter, April 2017): 42-49. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-
Force-Quarterly-85/Article/1130660/operational-graphics-for-cyberspace/  
 
 This article utilizes graphical representation, common in military briefings, to depict 
cyberdefense and a simulated cyberattack.  The use of familiar graphics and a 
descriptive layout allows for easier comprehension of an oftentimes difficult topic.  The 
article begins by explaining why it uses certain graphic and how some had to be slightly 
altered to accurately depict aspects of cyber defense.  The graphics included show a 
common layout of a network and how it is managed and protected, followed by 
notational cyber unit icons, notational cyberspace terrain, and the sequential actions of 
multi-layered cyberattack. It concludes with showing how mission graphics can be 
adopted into the cyber realm and a final graphical depiction of how an adversary can 
steal legitimate credentials and infiltrate a secure network.        
 
National Institute for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies. Department of Homeland Security. 
https://niccs.us-cert.gov/training  
 
This official DHS site provides free directed and independent study online courses and 
in-classroom training in cybersecurity for government employees, government 
contractors, veterans, and in a more limited capacity to state, local and tribal 
employees/officials. The majority of the coursework is designed for career training yet 
there are several courses that serve to bring a greater understanding of cybersecurity 
and cyber-threats.  
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  United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) https://www.us-cert.gov/.  
 
The US-CERT was established in 2003 following several Federal Government cyber 
breaches in 2000.  The agency’s mission is to: 
● Provide cybersecurity protection to Federal civilian executive branch agencies 
through intrusion detection and prevention capabilities 
● Developing timely and actionable information for distribution to federal 
departments and agencies; state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) governments; 
critical infrastructure owners and operators; private industry; and international 
organizations.   
● Responding to incidents and analyzing data about emerging cyber threats. 
● Collaborating with foreign governments and international entities to enhance 
the nation’s cybersecurity posture.   
CONTEXTUALIZING CYBER 
"Cyber Analogies." Naval Post Graduate School. February 28, 2014. 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/40037/NPS-DA-14-001.pdf.  
 
The challenges faced in the cyber domain are new to policy makers and strategists alike. 
By creating analogies for cyber related events with well-known events in military 
history, a contextual framework is established to reduce the complexity of the 
challenges faced in the cyber domain. The report’s goal is to ground cyber challenges in 
reality for those without expertise.   
 
Gartzke, Erik. "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to 




Cyber is the newest domain that world powers are jockeying over for control. A weapon 
that almost exclusively is used against sovereign states as opposed to the kinetic 
weaponry used in the proxy wars fought against third parties. Cyber systems support all 
aspects of modern warfighting and state infrastructure activities in most nations, and 
the employment of offensive cyber capabilities can cripple multiple facets of a nation’s 
ability to conduct military operations without attribution. The article aims to ground 
cyberwar as a contemporary strategy for military strategists to achieve tactical 
objectives. Cyber capabilities merely enhance the toolkit of strategists so that they can 
more effectively inflict damage on adversaries in a multitude of ways.  
 
Ferdinand, Jason. “Building Organisational Cyber Resilience: A Strategic Knowledge-Based View 
of Cyber Security Management.” Journal of Business Continuity & Emergency Planning 9, 
no. 2 (September, 2015):185-195. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26642176. 
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 This publication analyzes cyber resilience in an increasingly cyber dependent world and 
makes recommendations as to how an organization can build a program that maintains 
and assesses its cyber resilience.  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
